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Abstract. Th is paper presents a theoretical investigation of the issue of lying from 
a semiotic perspective and its specifi c aim is the analysis of the theory of the lie as 
conceived by Aurelius Augustinus, bishop of Hippo (354–430 A.D.), also known 
as Augustine or St. Augustine. Th e latt er devoted two short treatises to the issue of 
lying: De mendacio (On lying) and Contra mendacium (Against lying), writt en in ca. 
395 DC and 420 DC, respectively. Th e paper will focus on duplicity and intention 
to deceive as fundamental and necessary features of the lie. Augustine’s chief 
contribution to the study of human deception was to have severed the assessment 
of what is a lie from factual falsity. For Augustine, at the kernel of the notion of 
lying lies the idea of intentionality. Following this line of thought, the paper singles 
out two types of intentionality, namely the intention to assert a falsehood and the 
intention to mislead. On the basis of this double nature of intentionality, the present 
paper seeks to outline a theoretical framework for the study of species of falsehoods. 
Th e outcome is a typology of untruthfulness that envisages a fourfold inventory of 
falsehoods based on the diff erence between jokes, errors, lies and pretences.
Keywords: St. Augustine, lying, deception, intentionality, typology of falsehoods.
1. Introduction
Th e article presents a theoretical investigation of the issue of lying, and its specifi c 
aim is the analysis of the theory of the lie as conceived by Aurelius Augustinus, 
bishop of Hippo (354–430 A.D.), also known as Augustine or St. Augustine. He 
devoted two short treatises to the issue of lying: De mendacio (On lying) and Contra 
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mendacium (Against lying),1 writt en in ca. 395 DC and 420, respectively. Th ese two 
opuscula present the core of Augustine’s insights into lying and thus constitute the 
main object of analysis. Th e two short tracts specifi cally addressed the problem 
of lying and presented Augustine’s fi rm veto against mendacity among mankind. 
Th e bishop of Hippo argued for an absolute prohibition of lying; for Augustine, it 
was not permitt ed to lie under any circumstances, even to save a friend’s life. From 
this viewpoint every lie is thought of as inherently sinful, no matt er how and why 
the liar engages in such sin, and regardless of the consequences of such blameful 
action. Augustine’s condemnation of the lie stems from Biblical prohibitions, in 
particular Ps. 5.6–7 (“You hate all evildoers; you destroy all who speak falsehood”) 
and Mt. 5.37 (Say, ‘yes’ when you mean ‘yes’ and ‘no’ when you mean ‘no’) and 
from the authority of the Ninth Commandment, “Th ou shalt not bear false witness” 
(Ex. 20:16). Augustine is usually remembered for his austere condemnation and 
infl exible opposition towards any kind of lie. What is perhaps less known is his 
taxonomy of graveness of lies. Notwithstanding Augustine’s irremovable stance 
towards lying, that is, a lie is intolerable and always condemnable, he also argued 
that lies present diff erent degrees of culpability (De mend. 14.25; 21.42). As the 
bishop pointed out in his “Enchiridion on faith, hope and charity”: 
To me, however, it seems to be obvious that every lie is a sin, but that it makes 
a great diff erence which is the intention underlying the lie and what are the 
objects about which one is lying. (Augustine 2007[1847])2
In De mendacio the Latin rhetor proposed an eightfold hierarchical classifi cation of 
lies, ranging them from the most condemnable – lies about religious matt ers, to the 
most excusable, that is, lies told to avoid someone from being sexually assaulted. 
Augustine’s treatise on mendacity is one of the fi rst att empts in Western 
scholarship to provide a systematic study of lying and to provide a concise, clear-
cut and reliable defi nition of what constitutes a lie. Th is was certainly a priority for 
the author: to set forth a working defi nition of the lie that would have helped to 
distinguish the lie from what is not a lie, and would vigorously condemn all sort 
of lies, thus avoiding any misunderstandings. Hence, Augustine’s fi rst concern 
was to provide a valid defi nition of lying that would have clarifi ed uncomfortable 
ambiguities around this matt er. Aft er having set forth the defi nition of lying, 
1 All citations in English of Augustine’s De mendacio and Contra mendacium have been 
taken from Augustine 1952, translated by S. Muldowney. Latin citations have been taken from 
Augustine of Hippo 1900. De mendacio. Contra mendacium. De opere monachorum. De fi de et 
symbolo. Ed Iosephus Zycha. Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, 41, Vienna: F. Tempsky.
2 Ench. 18: “Quisquis autem esse aliquod genus mendacii quod peccatum non sit putaverit decipiet 
se ipsum turpiter, cum honestum se deceptorem arbitratur aliorum.”
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Augustine had to prove that instances of untruthfulness present in the Bible were not 
lies. Th erefore, he provided counter-arguments to all tenets coming from advocates 
of the indulgency of lies who claimed that lying was indeed necessary or excusable 
if told under certain extreme circumstances, such as saving someone from death or 
avoiding defi lement, and that lying occurs even in the Scripture.
Hence, for Augustine the defi nition of what constitutes a lie is the starting point 
before any further considerations can be introduced. His defi nition of the lie, namely 
“a false statement utt ered with the intention to deceive” (Contr. mend. X) had a strong 
impact on theories of deception that followed, and his view about the morality of the 
lie is still present in Western thought and of course endorsed by many theologians and 
moral philosophers (Ramsey 1985: 514). As Silvana Vecchio (2000: 848) points out: 
“[T]he defi nition of lying formulated by St. Augustine is the defi nition par 
excellence and the inescapable starting-point for all medieval treatments of the 
problem of lying”. Similarly, Dallas G. Denery II (2007: 113) writes: “If lying has a 
history, it is a history that at fi rst glance seems to have slowed to a crawl under the 
weight of Augustine’s authority”. 
Having said that, I shall now briefl y recall some authors who acknowledged 
the potential semiotic signifi cance of Augustinian writings about lying. It is worth 
noting that De mendacio belongs to a period when Augustine devoted himself 
to the composition of writings about issues that today fall under the rubric of 
‘semiotics’. Th e treatise was in fact writt en shortly before De doctrina christiana 
(started in 396), Confessions (397) and De trinitate (started in 399) – all books 
well known in Western scholarship for their semiotic import (Tagliapietra 2007: 
37). Although the issue of lying as such seen from the Augustinian perspective was 
never thoroughly investigated from a semiotic vantage point, a few commentators 
foresaw hints pointing at the semiotic drift  inherent in Augustine’s analysis of lying. 
Augustine’s semiotic import as to the theory of the lie is thus acknowledged, yet left  
open to future research. Marcia L. Colish (1978: 16), for instance, holds that the 
De mendacio and the Contra mendacium “contain Augustine’s most detailed analysis 
of the semiotic signifi cance and ethical import of lying”. In the same vein, in his 
short history of semiotics, Omar Calabrese holds that Augustine’s treatment of the 
lie is remarkable for “it does not treat the lie from an ontological viewpoint but as a 
linguistic act”.3 Indeed, in a lucid yet intricate analysis Augustine demonstrated that 
“what matt ers for lying is not what is or not the case, but what the liar takes to be the 
case. Lying is a matt er of belief rather than reality”.4 To put it another way, Augustine 
3 “Agostino la tratt a semioticamente, e non ontologicamente, in quanto vero e proprio att o 
linguistico” (Calabrese 2001: 49). My translation into English – R. G. 
4 King, Peter. Augustine: Th e truth about lying. Paper presented at the UCLA Moody Con-
ference on “Lies and Liars” (February 14, 2004). Available at htt p://individual.utoronto.ca/ 
pking/unpublished/Augustine_on_Lies.pdf.
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lift ed up the discussion of lying from an ontological paradigm that had dominated 
in Greek culture and had tackled the problem of lying within the frame of objective 
falsehoods, to the metalevel of the interpreter’s beliefs and intentionality. Th e latt er 
is thus conceived as a conscious performer who willingly uses a deceptive mode of 
signifi cation, that is, making use of signs in order to deceive. As it will be argued in 
what follows, the present study suggests a semiotic reading of Augustine’s theory of 
lying for it envisages lying as an intentional act performed by an agent by means of 
signs with the specifi c purpose of misleading others. ‘Agency’ is hereby conceived as 
the capacity of an agent to act in the world. 
Having said that, it is important to point out from the start that the present 
study does not proceed from any ethical and moral intent in the scholarly treatment 
of the phenomenon of lying. Rather, its focus is on the phenomenology of lying 
seen through a semiotic perspective. Our concern is semiotic not exegetical, and if 
Augustine dedicated much space to the latt er issue, it does not follow that a semiotic 
investigation of lying inspired by Augustine is untenable on the ground of the author’s 
religious inclination. Doubtless, Augustine was a man of faith and his main concerns 
were pastoral and exegetical in character. Nonetheless, his inclination and priorities 
did not preclude him from articulating a general theory of signs that centuries later 
was labelled as semiotic and recognized for its great import, as thoroughly studies 
on the topic have pointed out (Deely 2005; Manett i 1993; Todorov 1984). Hence, 
we ought to distinguish Augustine the theologian from Augustine the “proto-
semiotician”, to borrow an expression of John Deely (2005: 10). It is on the latt er 
fi gure that the present account seeks to shed light.
2. Augustine on lying: defi nition and characteristics of the lie
Th e aim of the present section is to describe, explain and analyse Augustine’s semiotics 
of lying as conceived in De mendacio. Th e chapter will focus on the Augustinian 
defi nition of lying and the salient characteristics of the lie. Occasionally, beside the 
analysis of the De mendacio, I shall consider additional Augustinian writings in order 
to support the theoretical background of the discussion.5 Now some preliminary 
notes about Augustine’s thesis on lying are in order.
5 Th e “great question” (magna quaestio) of lying and the critique of mendacity are persistent 
themes in Augustine’s works, a profound interest that transcends the two books mentioned 
so far. Undoubtedly, a thorough investigation of the Augustinian theory of lying necessitates a 
review and understanding of some of Augustine’s other works. Th e bishop of Hippo refers to the 
issue of lying in several other writings: De doctrina christiana, De magistro, De trinitate, Enchiridion 
ad Laurentium de fi de, spe et caritate. However, to frame a coherent Augustinian theory of the 
lie, the primary sources used are Augustine’s writings in which the topic of lying constitutes 
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De mendacio was writt en shortly aft er Augustine had been nominated coadjutor 
bishop of Hippo (395 DC) and it mainly consists of an enquiry into the following 
issues: “[T]he nature of lying, the question as to whether or not a lie is ever to be 
permitt ed, the discussion of several Scriptural passages pertaining to the subject, 
and fi nally, a list of various kind of lies” (Muldowney 1952: 47). For the sake of 
clarity and along with King (2004: 1 – see fn 4 above) we can succinctly sum up the 
three main questions addressed by Augustine in De mendacio as follows:
(1) What is a lie?
(2) What does the wrongfulness of a lie consist in?
(3) What are the circumstances in which lies are forbidden, permitt ed or enjoined?
Th e fi rst issue is of crucial importance for it sets forth a defi nition of the object 
of study and therefore it constitutes the starting point from which any further 
investigation might be considered.
Augustine returned to the problem of lying almost a quarter of century later with 
a second thesis about lying, Contra mendacium. Being addressed to Cosentius, a 
Spanish bishop who specifi cally asked Augustine whether lying were permissible in 
order to convert Priscillianists,6 the tract presents a close examination of alleged cases 
of lying in the Old Testament. Augustine examines several cases of untruthfulness 
present in the sacred scriptures. Aft er a close scrutiny the bishop concludes that 
instances of untruthfulness in the Bible are not to be considered lies as they present 
a metaphorical meaning and are therefore rather considered as allegories. Compared 
with De mendacio, the second book on lying presents a narrower view of the object 
of analysis for it focuses on a specifi c issue: whether one may feign heresy in order 
to discover heretics. Th e treatise’s main thrust is thus to tackle the issue of whether 
it is possible to lie about religious matt ers, lying to liars and heretics, and lying to 
convert someone else. Th e opusculum reiterates the main thesis and defi nitions 
that were anticipated and thoroughly investigated in the previous book on lying, 
namely De mendacio. As Boniface Ramsey (1985: 509) pointed out “the Contra 
mendacium adds litt le to the teaching of its predecessor”. Indeed, Contra mendacium 
is an open assault upon lying, whereas De Mendacio fi rst proposes an att entive and 
subtle scrutiny about the nature of lying per se. Augustine himself mentioned the 
diff erence between the two opuscula in the fi rst book of the Retractationes. Here the 
rhetor, reviewing his previous works, did not avoid self-criticism towards his own 
the principal and only concern of the author, namely De mendacio and Contra mendacium. 
As additional sources those Augustinian works are considered that touch upon the topic of lying, 
albeit only tangentially or in an unsystematic fashion. To the list we shall also add the Soliloquies 
in which the doctor pointed out the diff erence between the mendacious and the fallacious., a 
distinction important in discerning intentional deception from other instances of falsehood.
6 For background on the Priscillianists, see Chadwick 1976.
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fi rst treatise De mendacio, for it appeared to be “obscure, intricate and altogether 
troublesome” (obscurus et anfr actuosus et omnino molestus) (Retr. 1.27), and was 
left  unpublished for this reason. Furthermore, Augustine confessed that due to the 
intricacy of De mendacio he had ordered to remove it from his collection of works. 
Th is request, however, was neglected. Only aft er Augustine had writt en his second 
treatise about lying, did he retract his criticism of his fi rst book, noting that in De 
mendacio were “to be found some necessary things” that were not present in the 
other (Contra mendacium).7 Th is is the reason why Augustine decided to keep the 
book in the end.8
In the De mendacio Augustine diff erentiated between (1) a descriptive, and (2) 
a normative treatment of the problem of lying (Feehan 1988: 132). Th e former is 
concerned with the nature of lying as such; the latt er instead refers to the morality of 
lying, that is, it engages in a consideration of whether and under which circumstan-
ces it is permissible to lie. Augustine made this distinction plain in the opening 
remarks of his opusculum:
Th e question of lying is important since it oft en disturbs us in our daily actions 
(1) lest we rashly blame ourselves for what, in reality, is not a lie, on the other 
hand, (2) lest we think that at times we must deviate from the truth by telling a 
lie through a sense of honor, of duty or even of mercy. (De mend. 1.1)9
Th e present section shall focus on the fi rst theoretical issue leaving aside the problem 
of the morality of the act of lying.
Belief and intentionality are key terms in the conceptualization of the pheno-
menon of lying in an Augustinian fashion. Augustine pointed out that the charac-
teristics of the lie are the split between thought and speech in the signifi cation of 
7 Augustine, Retractationes 1, PL 40.
8 Augustine’s insistence on the obscure and knott y nature of lying is a persistent theme in 
his writings. De mendacio is defi nitely uneasy reading as some commentators have pointed out 
(Feehan 1988: 131). Augustine remarked the diffi  culty of the matt er in the opening chapter of 
his fi rst treatise. In chapter 1.1 of De mendacio the father of the Church underscores the intricacy 
and the slippery nature of a topic that seems to be almost ungraspable. In order to explain these 
characteristics Augustine resorted to the anatomical analogy of a hand that cannot entirely grasp 
that which is holding. Furthermore, Augustine suggests the diffi  culty of the topic of lying as to be 
like the anfractuosity of a cavern, at one and the same time obscure and full of twists and turns: 
“It is, indeed, very full of dark corners, and hath many cavern-like windings, whereby it oft  eludes 
the eagerness of the seeker; so that at one moment what was found seems to slip out of one’s 
hands, and anon comes to light again, and then is once more lost to sight” (De mend. 1.1).
9 De mend. 1.1: “Magna quaestio est de mendacio, quae nos in ipsis quotidianis actibus nostris saepe 
conturbat ne, aut temere accusemus mendacium quod non est mendacium, aut arbitremur aliquando 
esse mentiendum, honesto quodam et offi  cioso et misericordi mendacio”.
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the lie (duplicity) and the intention to deceive.10 Th e liar’s mode of signifi cation 
is mis-informative and his discourse is the manipulation of the dupe’s beliefs and 
knowledge.
3. The duplicitous character of the lie
For Augustine, the fi rst element marking a lie is the incongruence between the 
internal thought of the liar and his external communication given by means of 
speech or other outer signs:
He lies … who holds one opinion in his mind and who gives expression to 
another through words or any other outward manifestation. For this reason the 
heart of the liar is said to be double, that is, twofold in his thinking: one part 
consisting of that knowledge which he knows or thinks to be true, yet does not 
so express it; the other part consisting of that knowledge which he knows or 
thinks to be false, yet expressed as true. (De mend. 3.3)
A lie thus entails a split between mind and speech. Th e liar presents a duplicitous 
character inasmuch as he has a “double heart” (duplex cor) and consequently a 
“double thought” (duplex cogitatio). Augustine’s fi rst characteristic of the lie is thus 
defi ned. As Paul J. Griffi  ths (2004: 25–26) pointed out:
Th e characteristic mark of the lie is duplicity, a fi ssure between thought and 
utt erance that is clearly evident to the speaker as he speaks. … Th e lie has 
only to do with whether there is a mismatch, a gap, a contradiction, a fi ssure, 
between what you think is true and what you claim as true.
Leaving aside, for the present, the question of whether the sole duplicity constitutes 
the essential and suffi  cient mark of the lie, as Griffi  ths seems to suggest, let us pause 
briefl y and ponder the nature of duplicity as a constituent characteristic of the lie.
Augustine contended that the liar has a “double heart” (cor duplex) and his 
duplicity is manifested in the hiatus existing between inwardly concealed believed-
truth and outwardly expressed truth. Lying involves concealment to the extent that 
10 Th e present study, along with Colish (1978; 1982; 1985; 2005), Feehan (1988; 1990; 1991), 
Swearingen (1991) and others, contends that the intention to deceive is a necessary element of 
the lie. Th is claim is at odds with Griffi  ths’ take of the Augustinian theory of the lie. Th e latt er 
contends that only the duplicity, conceived as split between what is in the mind of the speaker 
and what the speaker actually says, constitutes the essence and the necessary and suffi  cient 
condition of the lie (Griffi  ths 2004: 29–31).
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one façade, so to speak, of the liar’s thoughts remains concealed in the backstage 
of his mind, while another side of his thoughts is intersubjectively communicated 
to others by means of signs as if being believed truth by the liar – when a lie occurs 
thoughts and signs do not match each other in a sincere act of communication. 
As Ramsey (1985: 510) succinctly pointed out, for Augustine “lying or deceit is 
defi ned as the lack of correspondence between the thing contained in the mind and 
the thing expressed in whatever way”. In so doing, the liar pretends to signify that 
which he knows to be false as being true. He therefore expresses as being true what 
he takes to be false. Notably, ‘true’ and ‘false’ in this context refer to the liar’s state 
of mind, namely what the liar believes or thinks to be true or false. To put it another 
way, these terms do not refer to an ontological conception of truth as correctness 
or correspondence between what is said and things in the world. Rather, they refer 
to a pragmatic conception of truth that is based on what the liar takes to be true, 
regardless of the adequacy of comprehension and the state of aff airs.
Th e possibility of semiosis and communication available for interpreters of 
a given community is provided by shared conventional sign systems – natural 
language, for instance. Th e liar exploits this potentiality and possibilities of 
communication in order to pursue his own deceptive goals, that is, to model the 
dupe’s beliefs according to a patt ern that the liar himself is aware to be false. To sum 
up, lying entails duplicitous signifi cation, conceived as split between inner thought 
and outwards manifested signs.11
It is obvious that the ‘double heart’ is a lifelong concern present in Augustine’s 
writings. From what has been said so far, it can be argued that in tackling the issue 
of lying Augustine stressed the role played by the liar’s awareness in expressing 
something that is in contradiction with what the liar himself believes to be the case. 
Th is point can be formulated in the following terms. Th e liar’s awareness plays a 
11 Augustine insisted on this tenet in several of his works. Th e bishop of Hippo reiterated the 
theme of the duplex cor in the Contra mendacium. Th e idea of the “divided heart” is also present 
in the Enchiridion on faith, hope and charity. Here Augustine once again returned to the diff erence 
between the one who errs by expressing something which is merely incorrect and the liar who 
willingly asserts something that he thinks or assumes not to be true, holding that: “… the 
former has not one thing in his mind, and another in his speech; but the latt er, whatever in fact 
that which is said by him may be of itself, yet has one thing shut up within his breast, and another 
ready on his tongue; which is the special evil of lying”. Once again Augustine expressed the same 
tenet in Sermon 133, where he contends that the liar: “…] thinks in himself one thing to be true, 
he gives out another for truth. He is a double heart, not single; he does not bring out that which 
he has in it. Th e double heart has long since been condemned. “With deceitful lips in a heart and 
a heart have they spoken evil things,” where is the “deceitful lips”? What is deceit? When one 
thing is done, another pretended. Deceitful lips are not a single heart; and because not a single 
heart, therefore “in a heart and a heart;” therefore “in a heart” twice, because the heart is double” 
(Sermon LXXXII). 
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crucial role in Augustinian semiotics of deception in as much as the liar is conscious 
that some sort of falseness is at stake. Griffi  ths (2004: 37) correctly noted that:
Th e speaker is the privileged authority on the question of whether he lies. Since 
the Augustinian defi nition of the lie is indexed to the speaker’s understanding of 
the relation between her thought and speech, you will always know bett er than 
anyone else whether a particular utt erance of yours was duplicitous.
In other words, the stress posed by Augustine in theorizing about lying is on 
“what is going on in the mind of the liar” (Evans 1982: 67). Griffi  ths holds that 
Augustine drew on Sallust’s defi nition of the lie. Th is connection is quite plausible 
and the similarity between the two defi nitions is striking. Let us recall here then the 
defi nition proposed by Sallust:
Ambition led many to become false, to keep one thing concealed in the heart 
and to have another ready on the tongue, to judge friendships and enmities 
not as they are but in terms of benefi t, to look good rather than to have a good 
character. (Sallust quoted in Griffi  ths 2004: 26)
It is worth noting that this tradition of talking about the lie in terms of duplex cor 
is still present and alive in 1265–1274 when Th omas Aquinas writes his Summa 
theologiae. Th e latt er in fact acknowledged Augustine’s principle of the duplicity 
inherent in the act of lying recalling the etymology of the term ‘lying’ (mendacium) 
that “derives from the lie’s being speech contra mentem” (Aquinas 1971 Summa theol. 
Quest. 110). Th omas Aquinas takes this criterion of duplicity to be the moral and 
formal aspect of the lie and considers it so essential as to be the suffi  cient ingredient 
for a lie to be considered as such. A similar view is present in other commentators, 
such as Alexander Carpenter who writes that “to lie is to go against the mind, whence 
the lie, which is a sign false to the mind” (Carpenter quoted in Craun 1997: 40).12
Some authors have asked whether or not the English verb ‘to lie’ has a contrary 
(Anolli 2003; Bonfantini, Ponzio 1996). On the basis of Augustine’s conception of 
lying as speech contrary to the mind, it might be argued that lying stays in opposition 
with being sincere. Th is claim is correct if we oppose mendacity to sincerity as 
proposed by Suzanne Stern-Gillet (2008). She has pointed out that Augustine poses 
a philosophical question of sincerity as being a quality of the subject:
12 E. D. Craun refers to Carpenter (1516), Speculum Morale 1277: “mentiri est contra mentem 
ire, & inde mendacium quo est falsum mentis signum” (Carpenter, Alexander 1516. Destructorium 
viciorum. Paris: C. Chevallori). 
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Sincerity is a quality of the self … It designates a relationship of congruence 
or harmony between diff erent parts, aspects or manifestations of the self. Th ese 
includes not only thoughts, feelings and emotions, but also the awareness  – 
or lack of it – that the subject has of them, as well as the manner in which 
he expresses – or fails to express – them. … Sincerity is the commendable 
disposition to match what we express to what we feel. (Stern-Gillet 2008: 3–4)
To put it another way and borrowing a formula used by Luigi Anolli, we are in 
presence of sincerity when a person “believes in what he says and says what he 
believes”.13 While this observation may seem trivial, as a matt er of fact duplicity is a 
marker of mendacity, and however obvious it might seem, it is important to make 
this point.
In order to understand Augustine’s view on lying it might be helpful to have a brief 
and concise excursus on his theory of language. For Augustine lying is sinful to the 
extent that the liar breaks the rules of communication deviating from the common 
goal that language possesses, namely to communicate truthful knowledge, e.g., each 
speaker saying something according to his own mind. To put it another way, lying 
is a “sin of the tongue” (Casagrande, Vecchio 1987) for it displays incongruence 
between the mind and the tongue, so to speak. Th is is the fi rst theoretical reason 
behind Augustine’s scorn of lies. Viewed through this prism, lying constitutes a 
breakdown of communication for it perverts the original and proper use of speech, 
namely to communicate one’s thoughts to another translating inner thoughts by 
means of speech. As Edwin David Craun (1997: 43):
To pervert words by using them to convey what is not in the mind, then, is to 
commit a fundamental injustice against other humans and against the natural 
order as reason perceives it. To lie is to violate the communion of mind which 
speech makes possible. 
Th e perspective of lying as breakdown in communication brings about a con-
sideration on Augustine’s view on the theory of knowledge and epistemology of 
language. 
One of the loci classici of Augustinian disquisition about the function of language 
and the nature of communication is De magistro (Th e teacher) writt en in 389. Th ere 
is not enough space in the present article to give a full account of Augustine’s 
theory of signifi cation,14 but a brief excursus into the nature and purpose of 
language underscored by Augustine throughout his writings will certainly clarify 
13 “Crede in quello che dice e dice in quello che crede” (Anolli 2003: 20). My translation – R. G.
14  For background about Augustinian theory of signifi cation I refer to Colish 1982 and Jakson 
1969.
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the nature of lying, for the two issues are strictly bound to each other. I shall start 
with a consideration of the nature of language in the De magistro. It is based on a 
conversation between Augustine and his son Adeodato and investigates the role of 
language in teaching and gaining of knowledge. De magistro expresses Augustine’s 
critique of language as instrument of teaching; also, the bishop of Hippo envisages 
language as an imperfect means of communication and lists the main functions 
of language: (1) the transmission of knowledge; (2) recalling information and 
to preserve it in time (Augustine 1962[389]). Th e position of the doctor of the 
Church as concerns the fi rst function is contradictory. To be sure, Augustine does 
not hold the same position throughout the book, for on the one hand, he holds that 
knowledge is gained by means of signs and this contention is elaborated in the fi rst 
part of the dialogue. On the other hand, the bishop confutes his previous thesis 
proposing a contrary tenet, namely, that nothing is learned by means of signs (De 
magistro X, 33), and this claim is held throughout the second part of the dialogue. In 
order to corroborate the latt er stance, Augustine recalls the famous example of the 
word sarabara; a term that has no meaning for an interpreter if one does not know its 
referent before hand. As Gary Genosko (1995: 88) has pointed out: “One becomes 
acquainted, then, by means of the thing signifi ed rather than by coming to know 
the thing from the sign”. It is in the middle of this disquisition about the nature and 
function of language that Augustine mentions lying:
Hence words do not even have the function of indicating the mind of the 
speaker, if it is uncertain whether he knows what he is saying. Th ere are liars 
too and deceivers, so that you can easily understand that words not only do 
not reveal the mind, but even serve to conceal it. I do not of course in any way 
doubt that the words of truthful people are endeavouring to reveal the mind of 
the speaker and make some claim to do so, and would do so, all would agree, if 
only liars would not allowed to speak. (De mag. XIII, 42)
Disclosure and concealment, opacity and transparency of the speaker’s thoughts 
are mediated by means of speech. However, for Augustine the proper function 
of language is the communication of one’s thoughts, and this att itude is present 
in ‘truthful people’, as the bishop has put it. On the contrary, liars contradict this 
principle inasmuch as they pervert language’s communicative function and lying is 
to be seen as “deliberate subversion of the canons of truth which undergird language 
as a healthy, working medium of both thought and communication” (Swearingen 
1991: 202). 
Notwithstanding the imperfect nature of language as tool for communication 
and acquisition of knowledge, this is not to say that for Augustine human beings are 
allowed to bend the function of speech to serve their own evil purposes. It is possible 
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to suggest along with Augustine that the institution of language was established to 
provide men with the faculty of speaking with each other, for men lack the ability 
to look in one another’s minds and perceive what is in their own hearts. Notice that 
Augustine distinguished the communication that goes on between man and God 
from communication between men. Th e latt er are obliged to communicate their 
thoughts by means of speech or other outer signs, whereas the communication 
between God and man does not require words, while God is cordis inspector. Th is 
point is outlined by Augustine’s De mendacio:
When a statement is made to God alone, then only in the heart is truth involved; 
but, when the testimony is given to man, then the truth must be expressed by the 
mouth of the body, because man cannot see the heart. (De mend. XXVII, 36)
Language can thus deviate from its original function and in this deviation lies the 
contradiction that lying displays. As Jan C. Swearingen (1991: 230) states:
Augustine extends an earnest truth-seeking language model in the doctrine that 
language should always be used to say what is in the speaker’s heart – the verbum 
cordis – the word which expresses the truth that has been found by the refl ecting 
mind seeking truth through contemplative thought.
Th us, lying is an infraction of the institution of the language. Never is Augustine 
more consistent in explaining the communicative function of language as in the 
following excerpt taken from the Enchiridion on faith, hope and charity (Augustine 
2007[1847]):
Everyone who lies is contradicting what he thinks in his heart, with the 
intention to deceive. Language, however, is created not for the purpose that 
human beings deceive each other with the help of language, but for the purpose 
of mutually communicating their thoughts. Hence, using human language in 
order to deceive/mislead instead of using it according to the purpose language 
was created for, that is a sin. (Enchir. XXVIII).
Viewed from such a perspective, the communication context envisaged by Augustine, 
naïve as it might seem, is governed by a convention requiring truth-telling. It is the 
breaking of this convention that confers to the lie its sinful character. 
Another important issue is whether the sole criterion of duplicity or double-
mindedness is an indispensable and suffi  cient condition for lying. Th ere is no 
general consensus as to whether the Augustinian lie is determined solely by the 
duplicity, conceived as a split, mismatch or contradiction between the content of the 
thought and the expression of it by means of signs. Griffi  ths (2004: 29) contends 
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that Augustine specifi cally indicated that the evil of the lie is to be duplicitous. It 
is quite peculiar, however, that the author ignores other quotations where the liar’s 
intention to deceive is taken in consideration. In contradiction to Griffi  ths, the 
present study views the intention to deceive as the conditio sine qua non for lying. 
Th is is apparent from several indications given by Augustine throughout his works. 
By drawing on certain observations made in Augustine’s De mendacio, we contend 
that the distinctiveness of lying resides in the speaker’s intention to deceive. Now 
an excursus into the nature of deceptive intentionality seen through the lens of 
Augustine’s theory is in order.
 
4. The intention to deceive
Th e contention that the distinctiveness of lying lies in the intention to deceive is 
based on Augustinian insights regarding intentionality as the essential feature of the 
lie. We aim at supporting the thesis that envisages deceptive intentionality as the 
pragmatic aspect of the lie, and considers it as one of the most important features of 
mendacity.
Th e fi rst indication given by Augustine as concerns deceptive intentionality is 
pointed out when the bishop sets forth the diff erence between joking and lying at 
the outset of his treatise De mendacio. Augustine pointed out that jokes are not lies 
inasmuch as they are “accompanied by a very evident lack of intention to deceive” 
(De mend. 2.2). Aft er this fi rst indication, Augustine goes on to explain the diff erence 
between lying and errors and, on the basis on such diff erences, he provides his 
defi nition of the lie as speech contrary to the mind. Shortly aft er indicating the 
“double heart” as the fi rst characteristic of the lie Augustine explicitly returns to the 
intention to deceive as a distinctive feature of the lie in the following passage:
For, a person is to be judged as lying or not lying according to the intention of 
his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the matt er itself. He who 
expresses the false as true because he thinks it to be true may be said to be 
mistaken or rash, but he cannot, in fairness, be said to be lying, because, when he 
so expresses himself, he does not have a false heart nor does he wish to deceive; 
rather, he himself is deceived. In reality, the fault of the person who tells a lie 
consists in his desire to deceive in expressing his thought. (De mend. 3.3)15
15 De mend. 3.3: “Ex animi enim sui sententia, non ex rerum ipsarum veritate vel falsitate mentiens 
aut non mentiens judicandus est. Potest itaque ille qui falsum pro vero enuntiat, quod tamen verum esse 
opinatur, errans dici et temerarius; mentiens autem non recte dicitur, qui cor duplex cum enuntiat non 
habet nec fallere cupit sed fallitur. Culpa vero mentientis est in enuntiando animo suo fallendi cupiditas, 
sive fallat cum ei creditor falsum enuntianti, vel cum ei non creditur, vel cum verum enuntiat voluntate 
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Th us, Augustine conceives of lying as intentional deception. As Swearingen (1991: 
203) pointed out: “Augustine emphasizes that the interior knowledge and intent 
which exists in an individual’s mind is the defi nitive criterion of deceit”. 
Another important point to be inferred from the above passage, is that the focus 
on intentionality acknowledges a shift  in the study of lying for it allows to prescind 
from the “falsity of the matt er itself ”, that is to say, from an ontological aspect of 
exactness or correspondence between subjective an objective truth, stressing the 
role played by subjective truthfulness in determining whether a lie actually occurs. 
To put it diff erently, Augustine underscored the diff erence existing between the 
truth of the things spoken and the speaker’s intentions. 
Augustine returned to the point of intentionality in lying in several passages 
throughout his writings. Th e defi nition of lying singled out in the Contra mendacium 
reaffi  rms the point of intentionality as distinctive element of the lie made already 
in the De mendacio. In his late writing on lying Augustine stated the following: “Let 
no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false 
statement utt ered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie” (Contr. mend. X).16
Hence, intentionality is Augustine’s crux in his att empt to defi ne of what 
constitutes a lie. Marcia L. Colish (1982) suggested that the stress on intentionality 
embedded in the Augustinian treatment of the lie stems from the Stoics’ infl uence 
present in Augustine’s thought. Th e author claims that sign theory stemming from 
the doctrine of the Stoa had a strong impact on the ways in which a series of Latin 
thinkers, from Nigidius Figulus to St. Anselm tackled the issues of lying and false 
statements (Colish 1982: 19). Th e author claims that Augustine’s insistence on 
intentionality is a derivation of the Stoic theory of lekta. As the author explains, 
the latt er is to be conceived as “intellectual intentions”, “one member of a quartet 
of entities called incorporeal, along with space, time and the void” (Colish 1982: 
23). What is important for this analysis is the fact that Augustine’s take on the 
Stoic lekta yields a theory of signifi cation based on the diff erence between words 
and intellectual intentions outlined by Augustine in De dialectica. Here the author 
distinguishes between verbum, that is words that possess an acoustic form, and 
dicibile, that is the meaning, “immaterial entity perceived by the mind and not by 
the hear” (Colish 1982: 25). Colish (1982: 25) further points out that “it is on the 
basis of this distinction between words and intentions that one can provide a Stoic 
explanation of linguistic ambiguities despite the natural derivation and signifi cance 
of language; diff erent speakers may be expressing diff erent intentions through the 
same words”. It is exactly this move in the consideration of internal meaning in 
fallendi quod non putat verum. Quod cum ei non creditur non utique fallit, quamvis fallere voluit, nisi 
hactenus fallit quatenus putatur ita etiam nosse vel putare eu enuntiat.”
16 Contr. mend. XII, 27: “mendacium est falsa signifi catio cum voluntate fallendi”.
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terms of intentions that explains how language and signifying systems may be used 
as means of falsifi cation, for the “double capacity of words to signify both real things 
and inner intentions” (Colish 1982: 27).
 Augustine did not take for granted the fact that lying presupposes an intention 
to deceive. Rather, the question as to whether lying presupposes the intention to 
mislead constitutes one of the main foci of the analysis carried out in the fi rst part 
of De mendacio. Augustine states, “a very penetrating investigation may be made as 
to whether there be any lie at all when the deliberate will to deceive is lacking” (De 
mend. 3.3). In order to support his contention Augustine proposed an interesting 
analysis of two particular cases: 
(1)  Telling something false without any intention to deceive;
(2)  Telling the truth with the intention to deceive.
In other words, Augustine att empts to separate the two criteria that constitute a lie 
in order to assess whether only one of them, either the will to tell a falsehood or the 
intention to mislead, can function as the sole suffi  cient element for a lie to occur. 
Augustine introduced the two cases with the example of the “skeptical friend”, 
namely, a listener who has no trust in the speaker. As Christopher Kirwan (1989: 
197) pointed out, the two cases with reference to “a speaker who expects to be 
disbelieved” can be listed as follows:
(i) Th e speaker may say what he thinks is true with the purpose of inducing belief 
in what he thinks is false; or
(ii) Th e speaker may say what he thinks is false with the purpose of inducing belief 
in what he thinks is true.
We now shall turn to these case studies. Th e main theoretical question is the 
following: does the intention to deceive constitute an essential feature of the lie?
As it will become apparent in the analysis that follows, Augustine’s examples 
involve what Robert W. Mitchell (1986: 3) calls “awareness of another’s awareness 
on the part of the deceiver”. Th e latt er distinguished four levels of deception. 
Mitchell’s (1986: 26) fourth-level deception involves the intention to deceive 
and also a modifi cation of the deceiver’s behaviour or deceptive strategy “based 
on knowledge of the other’s past and present behaviour”. Th is is an important 
point to be made insofar as Augustine considers the way in which the liar models 
his behaviour/strategy of deception according to the knowledge of the dupe’s 
present att itude. Th us, at this level of deception, there exists, as Mitchell says, 
the “recognition of the other animal’s belief about actions” (1986: 25). Also the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett  (1978; 1987) subscribes to a similar view holding that 
in order to intentionally deceive someone there must be a second-order intentional 
system, that is, the deceiver must have beliefs about the intended victim’s beliefs.
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5. Two cases: asserting a falsehood without the intention 
of deceiving and asserting the truth in order to deceive
Augustine’s fi rst case study poses the example of the so-called ‘skeptical friend’:
In the fi rst place, we have a person who knows or thinks that he is speaking 
falsely, yet speaks in this way without the intention of deceiving. Such would be 
the case of a man who, knowing that a certain road is besieged by bandits and 
fearing that a friend for whose safety he is concerned will take that road, tells 
that friend that there are no bandits there. He makes this assertion, realizing 
that his friend does not trust him, and because of the statement to the contrary 
of the person in whom he has no faith, will therefore believe that the bandits are 
there and will not go by that road. (De mend. 4.4)17
Th e fi rst case study considered by Augustine refers to the situation in which someone 
asserts a falsehood without the intention to mislead. Th e expressed falseness is a 
factual falsity in the sense of objective falsity and it is believed to be false by the 
person who asserted it. In other words, Augustine presents a case of an expressed 
falsehood that matches both criteria of being, at one and the same time, an objective 
falsity (there actually are bandits in that road) as well a subjective falsity (he knows 
he is speaking falsely). Th is equals to say that that the assertum (what is asserted) 
neither matches the state of aff airs in the world nor the state of mind of the liar. Th at 
is to say that the speaker does not believe the assertum as true. 
Augustine further qualifi es the reason behind such an expression of falsehood 
as concerning someone else’s disbelief, namely the addressee. In other words, 
one asserts something false due to the hearer’s lack of trust towards the speaker. 
Th erefore, the latt er is fully aware of the fact that the hearer will not believe him. 
Th is is rather a peculiar situation as it may be when the hearer mistrusts the speaker, 
say a friend, on account of his fame of being a well-known liar. What is more, in 
expressing a falsehood the speaker’s fi nal concern is the wellbeing of his mistrustful 
friend. To sum up, the conditions set up by Augustine for the analysis of the fi rst 
case study are:
(1) A factual and believed-falsity asserted by someone as being true;
(2) Th e mistrust of the hearer towards the speaker;
(3) Th e intention of the speaker towards the wellbeing of the hearer.
17 De mend. 4.4: “Unum qui scit aut putat se falsum dicere et ideo dicit ne fallat, velut si aliquam 
viam noverit obsideri a latronibus et timens ne per illam homo cujus saluti prospicit et eum scit sibi non 
credere, dicat eam viam non habere latrones ad hoc ut illac non eat dum ideo credit latrones ibi esse, 
quia ille dixit non ibi esse cui non credere statuit, mendacem putans”.
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Th e second case proposed by Augustine is the contrary of the fi rst. If in the former 
case Augustine severed the assertion of a falsehood from the intention to deceive, 
he now poses the case in which someone is mislead by means of truth. To wit, 
Augustine’s second case study centres on the situation in which a person tells the 
truth in order to deceive. Holding the same conditions of the former example, that 
is the addressee’s mistrust towards the addresser (2), Augustine reverts condition 
1 and 3. Th e speaker says what is believed as true and it is factually true (e.g. the 
speaker knows or thinks that there are bandits on a certain road and this claim is 
congruent with the state of aff airs). However, the speaker’s intention is diff erent to 
the extent that the person is willing to deceive the mistrustful hearer. 
In the following passage Augustine provides an account of his second case study:
In the second place, there is a case of the person who, knowing or thinking what 
he says true, nevertheless says it in order to deceive. Th is would happen if the 
man mentioned above were to tell his mistrustful acquaintance that there are 
bandits on the road, knowing that they actually are there and telling it so that 
his hearer, because of his distrust of the speaker, may proceed to take that road 
and so fall into the hands of the bandits. (De mend. 4.4)18
In the second example, then, the speaker is consciously asserting something that 
he knows to be true in order to deceive. He strategically uses the truth to trick 
his audience though technically he asserted what his true, both subjectively and 
factually. 
To sum up, the two cases considered by Augustine in the De mendacio may be 
grouped as in Table 1.









(i) To say a falsehood without 
intention to deceive
True False True Not to deceive
(ii) To say the truth in order to 
deceive
True True False To deceive
18 De mend. 4.4: “Alterum autem qui sciens aut putans verum esse quod dicit, ad hoc tamen dicit ut 
fallat; tanquam si homini non sibi credenda dicat latrones in illa via esse ubi re vera eos esse cognovit ut 
ille cui dicit per illam viam magis pergat atque ita in latrones incidat, dum putat falsum esse quod ille 
dixerit”.
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Having underlined the conditions governing the two cases and having severed the 
intention to deceive from the expression of falsity, Augustine continues his argu-
ment asking whether or not in these two cases the speaker lies. Th e following quar-
tet of options can be inferred from Augustine’s disquisition:
(1)  if lying entails saying something with the desire to say something false, then a lie 
occurs only in the fi rst case;
(2)  if lying entails saying something with the intention to deceive, then only the 
speaker in the second case actually lies;
(3)  if lying is an expression of any falsity, then both of them have lied: the fi rst 
because he intended to say something false, and the second because by saying 
the truth he wanted to led the hearer to have a false assumption;
(4)  if lying entails both the assertion of a falsehood and the intention to deceive, 
then neither of them has lied.
To conclude this, it is worth remembering that Augustine did not provide an 
ultimate answer to the questions arising from these puzzling cases. It seems that 
Augustine concluded his analysis by giving the reader topics for discussion and 
refl ection, leaving the door open to the reader’s interpretation. Augustine in fact 
concluded the chapter stating that:
However, no one doubts that he lies who deliberately says what is false with the 
intention of deceiving. It is clear, then, that a lie is a false statement made with 
the desire to deceive. But, whether this alone is a lie is another question. (De 
mend. 4.5)
What does occur in the aforementioned examples is a sort of reverse or topsy-turvy 
signifi cation, where the speaker asserts ‘yes’ in order to say ‘no’ and vice versa. Th is is due 
to the lack of the convention of truthfulness between the partners of communication, 
that is, the speaker is fully aware that in the hearer’s mistrustful interpretation of his 
words he will assume the contrary of what is expressed. What is peculiar is that in both 
examples there is already embedded a breach of faith since the communicative maxim 
of speaking truthfully is disregarded. If the convention of being truthful with each 
other is already missing, due to the speaker’s dishonest att itude, the same trust cannot 
be broken again inasmuch as it is already absent. Th e examples Augustine referred 
to rather reduce lying to a sort of communicative game that resembles a joke told by 
Sigmund Freud based on a train conversation between two Jews:
Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a train station in Galicia. ‘Where are you 
going?’ asked one. ‘To Cracow,’ was the answer. ‘What a liar you are!’ broke out 
the other. ‘If you say you are going to Cracow, you want me to believe you are 
going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you are going to Cracow. So why are 
you lying to me.’ (Freud 1960: 137–138)
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As Roberto Harari (2001: 104) points out, this joke “works on the capacity of the 
signifi er to say something true by making one believe that it is a lie, in an att empt to 
deceive the other, which it fails to do in this joke”.
Some further points ought to be made here. First of all, the focus on deceptive 
intentionality provides a view of the lie as a wilful att empt of deception regardless of 
whether the deceit is successful or unsuccessful. A lie that is seen through is still a lie. 
Furthermore, as it has been showed above, Augustine’s vision on lying is based 
mainly on the perspective of the liar. We have seen that Augustine gives great 
importance to the liar’s intentions and beliefs. However, when the bishop takes into 
consideration the two cases that have been discussed above, he bends his perspective 
to encompass a further element, that is, the dupe’s predisposition to believe the 
speaker. As Colish (1982: 32–33) has noted, here Augustine “has the rhetorician’s 
sensitivity to the importance of the speaker’s credibility as a factor aff ecting the 
function of his words as means of communication to the hearer”. By enlarging his 
view on lying to encompass also the dupe’s belief, Augustine’s perspective of the 
liar becomes biased in as much as he now considers a metalevel consisting of the 
listener’s lack of loyalty towards the speaker.
6. The intent to assert a falsehood
So far we have been using terms such as ‘signifi cation’, ‘expression’, ‘utt erance’ in 
an interchangeable manner in order to refer to the ways in which one conveys his 
thoughts to another by means of signs. However, in order to make this termi nology 
more consistent and precise, the use of the terms ‘asserting’ and ‘assertion’ could be 
suggested. Th ese terms shall indicate two order of things: 
(1)  what is asserted, the assertum;
(2)  the liar’s belief about the assertum.
I propose the distinction by drawing on Th omas D. Feehan and Roderick M. 
Chisholm’s insights posed in their philosophical analysis of the intent to deceive 
(Chisholm and Feehan 1977). I contend that their view on lying, based on the 
defi nition of assertion, is compatible with Augustine’s stance on mendacity. 
Th e issue at stake may be stated in the following terms. As noted above, the 
point to be made here is that one’s belief may refer to two orders of things and 
consequently be seen from two perspectives, namely what is said and the intention 
of what is said. As to the fi rst point, the liar wants that the dupe take what is said as 
true, hence believing the content of the liar’s assertion, the assertum. On the other 
hand, and this is the second point to be considered, to the extent that there exists a 
truth-telling convention among the participants of a process of communication, it 
is taken for granted that the liar says what he means. In other words, the liar wants 
 Augustine on lying: A theoretical framework for the study of types of falsehood   465
the dupe to believe that he himself believes what he asserts. To put it with Mahon 
(2008: 212), “[O]ne intends not only that others believe that what one says is true, 
but also that they believe that one believes that what one says is true”. For instance, 
if A says: “I will be going to London tonight”, A gives an informative account about 
his or her plans for the night and furthermore he or she conveys information about 
his/her belief towards that plan, “I believe that I will go to the party tonight”. To 
put it another way, we must discern the actual informative content of an assertion 
from the liar’s beliefs about that assertion. It is exactly the reciprocal trust existing 
between the partners in communication that is being exploited by the liar and used 
as a leverage to deceive the dupe. As Lilly-Marlene Russow (1986: 47) pointed out: 
“the deceiver must be able to have beliefs about the beliefs of the target of deception, 
must be able to represent the target as being a believer, and must be able to have 
beliefs about the causes of those other beliefs”.
Following this line of thought, I contend that this view is compatible with 
Augustine’s perspective on lying. Let us recall that for Augustine not only the 
institution of language has to serve the purpose of communication of thoughts 
between men who convey them through speech. Augustine pointed out that it is the 
speaker’s duty to express himself according to his own mind. He makes this point 
clear in the following passage, in which he recalls the Eighth Commandment to 
support the tenet that every man must speak truthfully: 
…] In the Decalogue itself is writt en: ‘Th ou shalt not bear false witness’, 
in which classifi cation every lie is embraced, for whoever pronounces any 
statement gives testimony to his own mind. (De mend. 5.6)
Th is passage is of crucial importance for understanding the Augustinian view on 
lying. According to this view, communication is not happening in a vacuum, but it 
is addressed to someone, in a particular context, to satisfy a specifi c purpose and all 
this is done with the presupposition of trust between the parties of communication. 
Th is reciprocal trust is based on the commitment of the speaker towards the listener 
in providing a “testimony of his own mind” in any act of communication. It is this 
quality of trust that someone becomes endowed with in an act of communication. A 
lie breaks it. Th is is why lying is considered to be unjust, for it is essentially equal to 
a “breach of faith” (Chisholm and Feehan 1977: 153). Augustine points out exactly 
this idea in the De doctrina christiana:
Everyone who lies commits iniquity … But no one who lies keeps faith 
concerning that about which he lies. For he wishes that the person to whom he 
lies should have that faith in him which he does not himself keep when he lies. 
But every violator of faith is iniquitous. (De doc. chr. I, XXXVI)
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From the aforementioned passage it becomes apparent that lying undermines 
sociality to the extent that mendacity betrays the existent trust between the 
parties of communication in a given social context. Th e one who lies infringes on 
the convention of being truthful with each other. Paul Grice outlined his conver-
sational maxims based on the co-operative principle so as to encompass a maxim of 
truthfulness, informativeness, relevance and clarity, and defi ned the fi rst maxim as 
“Do not say what you believe to be false” (Grice 1989). We will return to the issue of 
truthfulness. For the present, this issue may serve as a bridge towards the analysis of 
the concept of assertion with relation to lying. 
Th ere is a diff erence between utt erance and assertion. Th e latt er implies a 
constraint, a bind between the poles of communication. To explain the diff erence I 
draw once more on Chisholm and Feehan. Th e authors pointed out that:
What distinguishes lying as such from the other types of intended deception is 
the fact that, in telling the lie, the liar “gives an indication that he is expressing his 
own mind”. And he does this in a special way – by gett ing his victim to place his 
faith in him. Th e sense of ‘say’, therefore, in which the liar may be said to “intend to 
say what is false” is that of ‘to assert’. (Chisholm and Feehan 1977: 149)
Hence the authors distinguish lying from other types of deception on the basis of 
the assertive character embedded in the act of lying. 
What it interesting and worth quoting here at length is the defi nition of assertion 
that comes from Charles Sanders Peirce, considered by Chisholm and Feehan 
(1977: 149–150) as the most appropriate and clear defi nition of what goes under 
the rubric of ‘assertion’:
What is the nature of assertion? We have no magnifying-glass that can enlarge its 
features, and render them more discernible; but in default of such an instrument 
we can select for examination a very formal assertion, the features of which have 
purposely been rendered very prominent, in order to emphasize its solemnity. If 
a man desires to assert anything very solemnly, he takes steps as will enable him 
to go before a magistrate or notary and take a binding oath to it. Taking an oath is 
not mainly an event of the nature of a sett ing forth, Vorstellung, or representing. 
It is not mere saying, but is doing. Th e law, I believe, calls it an ‘act’. At nay rate, it 
would be followed by very real eff ects, in case the substance of what is asserted 
should be proved untrue. Th is ingredient, the assuming of responsibility, which 
is so prominent in solemn assertion, must be present in every genuine assertion. 
(Peirce, quoted in Chisholm and Feehan 1977: 150–151) 
Every genuine assertion, as Peirce pointed out, assumes its own responsibility to 
an audience to the extent of the pragmatic eff ects that might derive from it; or, as 
 Augustine on lying: A theoretical framework for the study of types of falsehood   467
Augustine argued, every statement gives testimony to his own mind taking the 
responsibility of what has been asserted. Notably, Augustine sometimes used a 
formula that was customary during the Roman times and was used to express the 
taking of responsibility fi rst towards the speaker’s own faith and, consequently, 
towards the other, the hearer, the community. Th e expression I refer to is ex animi 
sua sententia that means with full conscience”. Andrea Tagliapietra (2007: 36–37) 
traced the use of this formula to Cicero in his De offi  ciis.19 Augustine himself recalled 
this formula when proposing the defi nition of lying in the De mendacio. He states: 
“Ex animi enim sui sententia, non ex rerum ipsarum veritate mentiens aut non mentiens 
judicandus est” translated by Sister Mary Sarah Muldowney as follows: “a person is to 
be judged as lying or not according to the intention of his own mind, not according 
to the truth or falsity of the matt er itself ” (De mend. 3.3). Th e liar thus intends to say 
what is false, and it is according to the intention of his own mind that a liar must be 
judged as such. 
Bearing this in mind, two levels on intentionality can be described: 
(1) the intent to assert a falsehood; 
(2) the intention to deceive. 
What is characteristic of the lie is the fact that it entails a double deception. Th e dupe 
is not only mislead about the content of the assertion, he is deceived as concerns 
the intention of the speaker to disclose his mind in a trustful manner. Th is point is 
endorsed by Georg Simmel’s (1906) defi nition of the lie outlined in “Th e sociology 
of secrecy and secret society”:
Every lie, whatever its content, is in its essential nature a promotion of error 
with reference to the mendacious subject; for the lie consists in the fact that the 
liar conceals from the person to whom the idea is conveyed the true conception 
which he possesses. Th e specifi c nature of the lie is not exhausted in the fact 
that the person to whom the lie is told has a false conception of the fact. Th is 
is a detail in common with simple error. Th e additional trait is that the person 
deceived is held in misconception about the true intention of the person who 
tells the lie. (Simmel 1906: 445)
Drawing on Simmel, and Chisholm and Feehan who hold that “stating involves an 
intention about an intention” and that “If I state something to you, a part of my 
intention is that you have a belief about my intention and, indeed, that you have a 
belief about what it is that I intend that you believe” (Chisholm and Feehan 1977: 
151) it can be argued that lying involves a double assumption to be imparted to the 
19 Cicero, De offi  ciis, III, 29: “For swearing to what is false is not necessary perjury, but to take 
an oath upon your conscience, as it is expressed in our legal formulas and then fail to perform it, 
that is perjury”.
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dupe, namely an assumption regarding what has been asserted and the intention of 
the assertion. In other words, the dupe believes what the liar says, and believes that 
the liar believes what he says.
Up to this point I have been advocating a reading of Augustine that stresses the 
fi rst type of intentionality, namely the intention to assert a falsehood, as necessary 
for lying. Let us recall here another passage, this time taken from the De doctrina 
christiana, where Augustine underscored the fi rst type of intentionality we are 
referring to. He reported that: 
In a liar there is a desire to say what is false, and that is why we fi nd many who 
want to lie but nobody who wants to be misled. Since a person lies knowingly 
but is misled unknowingly, it is clear enough that in any given situation the 
person misled is bett er than the one who lies, since it is bett er to suff er injustice 
than to commit it. (De doc. chris. II, 86–87)20
Before turning to the consideration of the intent to deceive, another point ought to 
be made. As indicated above, Chisholm and Feehan posed a distinction between 
lying and other species of deception on the basis of the concept of assertion. To 
make matt ers more clearer, the authors refer to a specifi c aspect of deception 
reported by Immanuel Kant. In this example a man may feign to be about to leave 
on a trip by simply packing his luggage. In other words, the man pretends to be 
leaving by displaying a certain behaviour (packing his luggage) with the purpose of 
making someone else to assume that he is actually leaving. Th is example goes under 
the rubric of simulation and in particular under the strategies of “pretending”. At this 
point deceiving as such can be separated from the intent to assert a falsehood, which 
is proper to the lie. For the present, let us leave aside the problem whether there is 
possibly a type of falsehood which entails the sole intention to mislead. We shall 
return to this point in the next sections. 
7. Double intentionality as criterion 
for the distinction of species of falsehood
Lying does not stand in opposition to truth. If we are to conceive of the phenomenon 
of lying as simply possessing two dimensions, like two sides of the same coin, 
20 Green, On Christian Doctrine, trans. 49–51. De doctrina christiana I, XXXVI: “Inest quippe in 
mentiente voluntas falsa dicendi, et ideo multos invenimus qui mentiri velint, qui autem falli, neminem. 
Cum igitur hoc sciens homo faciat, illud nesciens patiatur, satis apparet in una eademque re illum qui 
fallitur eo qui mentitur esse meliorem, quandoquidem pati melius est iniquitatem quam facere”.
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respectively viewed as truth and falsity, we are on a wrong path: falsity has many 
shapes and truth has more than one counterpart. 
Michel de Montaigne (1952: 16) pointed out the multifariousness of false hood:
If falsehood had, like truth, but one face only, we should be upon bett er terms; 
for we should then take as certain the contrary to what the liar says: but the 
reverse of truth has a hundred thousand forms, and a limitless fi eld, without 
bond or limit. 
Montaigne was correct in noting that falsehood has many shapes and this point had 
not escaped the scrutiny of such a scrupulous investigator as Augustine. However, as 
the theologian pointed out, we should be careful in diff erentiating a lie from what is 
not one, insofar as falsehood exhibits manifold appearances and therefore not every 
falsehood is a lie (De mend. 2.2). In other words, the point to be made here is that 
lying and truth are not in a symmetrical relationship (Zupančič 2007).
Th e criterion of deceptive intentionality underpins the ground for a diff erentiation 
between modes of deception on the basis of two characteristics: intention to assert a 
falsehood and intention to deceive. It along with Augustine, the diff erence between 
lies, jokes and errors has been already noted. Th e present section shall provide a 
general framework for discerning types of falsehood on the basis of the criterion of 
the agent’s intentionality.
8. On the diff erence between lying and joking
Already in the fi rst page of his treatise, Augustine makes it clear that lies are not 
jokes. Th e criterion by which Augustine distinguishes the two is the intention to 
deceive. Augustine introduced the present distinction in the second chapter of the 
De mendacio: 
In this treatise I am excluding the question of jocose lies, which have never been 
considered as real lies, since both in the verbal expression and in the att itude 
of the one joking such lies are accompanied by a very evident lack of intention 
to deceive, even though the person be not speaking the truth. (De mend. 2.2)21
It is therefore outside Augustine’s enquiry to address jokes as such as in the joker’s 
playful att itude there is no evidence of intention to deceive. Drawing on Christopher 
21 Muldowney, “Lying,” 54. De Mendacio, 2.2: “Exceptis igitur jocis, quae nunquam sunt putata 
mendacia, habent enim evidentissimam ex pronuntiatione atquae ipso jocantis aff ectu signifi cationem 
animi nequaquam fallentis etsi non vera enuntiantis.”
470 Remo Gramigna 
D. Levenick’s (2004) insights about the nature of joking in Augustine’s writings, 
we shall now turn to the formal distinction between joking and lying and evaluate 
its importance and contribution in providing a more precise defi nition of what 
constitutes a lie. 
So far, it has been argued that joking cannot be mixed up with lying for the 
former lacks any intent to mislead and a playful intent is signalled by the joker’s 
mood. Gillian R. Evans (1982: 67) succinctly summed up this point:
Th e man who tells a joke makes it clear to his listener that he does not intend 
what he says to be taken seriously. His tone of voice, the sting in the tail of the 
joke, the revelation that he was jesting or teasing, when his listener has been 
taking him seriously, all make it impossible to confuse a joke with a lie, because 
the true state of aff airs is made plain in the end.
On the basis of this evidence, jokes and lies cannot be confused. Although joking 
is not lying, the two phenomena have at least one feature in common: they both 
meet the criteria of dealing with falsehoods. For Augustine, joking is a type of 
untruthfulness in so far as it involves falsity, albeit it is not a lie. As Levenick (2004: 
304–305) notes: “[A] joke, by its nature, involves the joker signifying something 
other than what he believes to be the actual case”. 
In his early writings, in particular in Soliloquies 2.10, Augustine draws a sharp 
distinction between ‘fallacious’ (fallax) and ‘mendacious’ (mendax).22 Th e former 
refers to deliberate deception whereas the latt er is “that which overtly presents 
harmless falsehoods for enjoyment” (Dox 2004:38). Falsehoods can thus be of 
two kinds: those that deliberately aim at deception and those whose purpose is to 
provide pleasure or enjoyment. Lies certainly belong to the fi rst category, whereas 
jokes and jests but also fi ction in general, poetry, literature and arts pertain to the 
second category. Th is distinction becomes apparent in the light of the following 
observation made by Augustine in the Soliloquies (Soliloquia):
Fallacious, strictly speaking, is that which has a certain desire to deceive and 
this cannot be understood apart from the soul. But deceit is practiced partly by 
reason and partly by nature; by reason in rational beings like men, by nature in 
beasts like foxes. What I call lying is done by liars. Th e diff erence between the 
fallacious and the mendacious is that the former all whish to deceive while the 
latt er do not all wish to do so. Mimes and comedies and many poems are full of 
lies, but the aim is to delight rather than to deceive. Nearly all who make jokes 
22 All English citations of Augustine’s Soliloquies are taken from Augustine 1953. All English 
references to Expositions on the Psalms are from Augustine 1960. References to Augustine’s 
Sermons are taken from Augustine1997(1867).
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lie. But the fallacious person, strictly speaking, is he whose design is to deceive. 
(Soliloq. 2.9.16)
In her treatment of theatre in Late Antiquity Donnalee Dox has pointed out that 
the diff erence between mendax and fallax was present also in Isidore of Seville. Th e 
author recalls the same distinction as it appears in the following quotation:
…] Not everyone who presents a lie intends to deceive; so there are mimes, 
comedies, and many poems where delightful lies are writt en to amuse rather 
than with a desire to deceive. And almost everyone who jokes, lies. (Isidore 
quoted in Dox 2004: 38) 
Augustine is clear and correct in making such a distinction. He clarifi es it explaining 
that:
What I call the fabulous kind of falsehood (mendax), the kind which is 
committ ed by those who tell fables. Th e diff erence between deceivers and 
fabulists is this, that every deceiver wants to deceive but not everyone who tells 
a fable has the desire to deceive. (Soliloq. 2.9.16)
However, it is worth noting that, although jokes and other sorts of fi ctions lack 
the intention to deceive, they do involve intentionality to the extent that they are 
intentional signifi cations although not intentional deceitful signifi cations. Th e 
intentionality involved here concerns two levels. On the one hand, jokes involve the 
use of what Augustine called signa data (given signs), that is, signs produced with the 
intention of signifying something.23 On the other hand, jokes involve intentionality 
to the extent that a will to assert a falsehood is nonetheless present. Th at is, the joker 
is aware of the false nature of his assertum.
Th is diff erence is apparent in Levenick’s study of the nature of jokes in 
Augustine’s writings. A joke, Levenick (2004: 308) says, is “a fi ctional transaction 
that is intentionally signifi ed for the purpose of humour” (Levenick 2004: 308). 
Following Levenick another quotation can be pointed out that further qualifi es 
the Augustinian point of view: “[I]n joking, there is not much perniciousness, for 
there is no deception, since the audience knows that what is said, is said as a joke” 
(Augustine quoted in Levenick 2004: 309). For the sake of the joke itself, that is, in 
order to be delightfully tricked, the audience is willing to “suspend the disbelief ”. As 
Levenick (2004: 309) succinctly pointed out: “Th e joker thus deceives, but only in a 
sense, for the deceit is mutually recognized (in that both the joker and the audience 
23 Given signs are “those which living things give to each other, in order to show, to the best of 
their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything that they have felt or learnt” (De doc. chr. II, 3).
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are aware of it)”. Jokes, considered as non-deceitful untruthfulness meet the wide 
defi nition of lying proposed by Oscar Wilde: “Th e aim of the liar is simply to charm, 
to delight, to give pleasure. He is the very basis of civilized society …” (Wilde 
20041889: 27).
 Both the joker and the audience are aware that they are taking part in a joke 
and that there exists a prior notifi cation and convention that grounds it. Augustine 
returned to the diff erence between lying and joking in Quaestionum in heptateuchum 
noting that: “[W]hen liars lie, they lie seriously, not joking; more over, when they 
are spoken jokingly, they are not lies and not reckoned as lies” (Augustine quoted 
in Levenick 2004: 310). Augustine reiterated this point in Expositions on the Psalms 
5. Once again, we fi nd a distinction made on the basis of the intention to deceive:
In fi ne, there are two kind lies, in which there is no great fault, and yet they are 
not without fault, either when we are in jest, or when we lie that we may do 
good. Th at fi rst kind, in jest, is for this reason not very hurtful, because there 
is no deception. For he to whom it is said knows that it is said for the sake of 
the jest. But the second kind is for this reason the more inoff ensive, because it 
carries with it some kindly intention. (Ex. Ps. 5.7)
As concerns our immediate purposes, let us focus on the fi rst kind of lie in which 
the audience is informed that the joker is teasing and there is an agreement upon the 
ludic, playful nature of the joke. Both the joker and the audience are fully aware of 
this. Augustine points out in the De mendacio that the fact that “the joke is a joke”, so 
to speak, is signalled by some signs that make the jocular intention clear. Th ese signs 
are the tone of voice and the aff ection of the soul of the speaker (the joker) (De mend. 
2.2). In other words, the joker presents some meta-communicative markers that 
signal that what is going on is a joke and must be taken as a joke. As Gregory Bateson 
(1987 1972: 139) has observed, in such jokes there is an exchange of “signals that 
would carry the message this is play”. Being aware of the nature of a joke is a tacit 
consensus in being playfully deceived, and this feature thus invalidates one of the 
principles upon which lying bases its strength, that is the incongruence between the 
two parties (the liar and the dupe) as concerns knowledge and believing. Lies are 
generally based on a knowledge disparity between the parties of the communicative 
act as the liar knows something more than the dupe and the situation is therefore 
unbalanced. On the contrary, in jokes, both parties share the same knowledge of 
participating in the here and now of a joke and both agree upon this convention. All 
these forms of falsehood involve the “suspension of the disbelief ” and therefore they 
lack any intent to deceive. Consequently they do not constitute a lie on Augustine’s 
account. As Paul Ekman (1985: 27) pointed out:
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In a lie the target has not asked to be mislead, nor has the liar given any prior 
notifi cation of an intention to do so. It would be bizarre to call actors liars. Th eir 
audience agrees to be mislead, for a time; that is why they are there.
A similar view is the one of Roger Caillois (2001[1958]: 19):
All play presupposes the temporary acceptance, if not of an illusion (indeed 
this last word means nothing less than beginning a game: in-lusio), then at least 
of a closed conventional, and, in certain respects, imaginary universe. Play can 
consist not only of deploying actions or submitt ing to one’s fate in an imaginary 
milieu, but of becoming an illusory character oneself, and of so behaving. One 
is thus confronted with a diverse series of manifestations, the common element 
of which is that the subject makes believe or makes others believe that he is 
someone other than himself. He forgets, disguises, or temporarily sheds his 
personality in order to feign another.
To put it another way, jokes, jests and fi ctional products lack the pragmatic aspect 
of the lie. Umberto Eco underscored this point when, in assessing the diff erence 
between fi ction and deceit, he noted that the former “has the semantic aspect of the 
deceit, but not the pragmatic one”.24 Th is claim is congruent with the diff erentiation 
of the three aspects of the lies (ontological, semantic and pragmatic) sketched out in 
the previous chapter. Indeed, jokes meet the criterion of intended falsehood but do 
not meet the additional criterion of intentional deceit.
9. On the diff erence between lying and errors
Having excluded jokes from the object of his study, Augustine devoted himself to 
another, more important concern, that is, “whether he may be considered as lying 
who does not actually tell a lie”.25 Th e question Augustine poses is whether or not 
lying involves falsity. Th e point at stake is the distinction between lies and mistakes, 
or to put it diff erently between deceiving others and “self-deceiving”, as the bishop 
puts it. Augustine notes that:
Th e fi rst problem, then, centers upon the question as to what constitutes a 
lie, for the person who utt ers a falsehood does not lie if he believes or, at least, 
assumes that what he says is true. (De mend. 3.3)
24 “Il fare fi nta ha tutt o l’aspett o semantico dell’inganno, ma non ne ha quello pragmatico” 
(Eco 1997: 37). My translation – R.G.
25 De men. 2.2: “… exceptis ergo jocis, prius agendum est ne mentiri existimetur qui non mentitur”.
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Lying does not necessarily entail falsity. Cases may occur when persons, albeit 
expressing something false, do this according to their own beliefs or assumptions 
and thus it does not fall under the category of lying. Let us take, for example, some 
scientifi c discoveries taken for correct until they were later confuted. As Umberto 
Eco has noted, assuming that Copernicus, Galileo Galilei and Kepler were right, 
Ptolemy affi  rmed for all his life that which was not the case (Eco 1997: 33). However, 
the latt er did not lie, inasmuch as he professed his creed with good faith, that is, he 
was expressing his ideas and beliefs according to his own mind. Th ey might have been 
wrong, but they were not lies. Th erefore, Ptolemy was not lying. He was unwillingly 
mistaken. It is worth noting that someone else than the one who mistakes is usually 
the person who points out errors. In other words, in order to consider falsity as an 
error it is needed a reality check or a further knowledge, more accurate or advanced, 
that allows to confute the previous paradigm and hence marks the former as wrong 
or incorrect. With reference to our example, Copernicus’ heliocentric model 
confuted the previous geocentric paradigm, that is, only further knowledge is able 
to surpass and correct the previous paradigm pointing at it as ‘wrong’. Th e one who 
mistakes is not aware of being in error. He is rather convinced, either by beliefs or 
by assumptions, that what he says corresponds to what he thinks and eventually to 
the state of aff airs. In other words, he speaks sincerely and mistakes unwillingly. On 
the contrary, as we shall see in what follows, the liar is fully aware of his mistake but 
nevertheless he intends to induce someone else to fall in error, making the latt er 
believe what the liar himself does not believe. 
Augustine proposes an interesting example of falsity with reference to heresy. 
Th e heretic, insofar as he believes or assumes something to be true that is not the 
case, simply errs. Augustine goes further analysing the case of a Catholic who, in 
order to convert a heretic, disguises his beliefs pretending to be what is not (Contr. 
mend. 3.4; 7.18). As Colish (1982: 35–36) points out:
Th e Catholic who dissimulates his faith is a worse sinner than the heretic. Th e 
heretic sins unknowingly, the Catholic knowingly, ‘the former against science, 
the latt er against conscience’; despite the lying Catholic’s good intention of 
saving the heretic’s soul his words are false both objectively and subjectively. 
From what has been said hitherto, it can be argued that there exists at least a double 
meaning of falsity: (1) false for us; and (2) false for others. It is clear, therefore, that 
the burden of falsity is balanced diff erently in the two cases. In the case of falsity 
‘for us’, namely lying, the weight of mendacity is carried by the liar. Th at is to say 
[…] Th e Catholic’s beliefs are true and in denying them he lies three times over, 
sinning against what is, against what he believes, and against the heretic whom 
he tries to deceive.
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that the liar’s awareness plays a crucial role in as much as the deceiver is conscious 
that some sort of falseness is at stake. On the contrary, in the second case, that of 
errors or mistakes, the weight of falseness is entirely carried by the receiver, in as 
much as the one who mistakes is totally unaware of it. Undoubtedly, a corollary 
of the described relation is the fact that in the aforementioned cases the eventual 
disclosure of truth is inverted. To wit, in the case of lying, the liar fi rst knows the 
truth and only aft er that is he able to fake it. Indeed, the liar’s cognitive condition is 
determined by the fact the he can count on a full account of what is falsity and truth 
for himself, whereas the dupe has access only to half of this. In the case of mistakes 
the relation with knowledge is inverted to the extent that the eventual discovery of 
truth is a follow up of an initial, unknown state of ignorance towards a particular 
issue or state of aff airs. Drawing on Paul J. Griffi  ths we have noted that “the speaker 
is the privileged authority on the question of whether he lies” (Griffi  ths 2004: 
37). To borrow Griffi  ths’ terminology, it can be affi  rmed that in the assessment of 
whether a mistake actually takes place the other is the “privileged authority”. Of 
course, it can happen that a mistake is pointed out by the same person who had 
been mistaken. However, what is needed is always a step further that shows either 
the correspondence or the incongruity between what is said to be the case and what 
actually is the case in relation to the state of aff airs.
Above I have considered what separates lies from mistakes, now we ought 
to contemplate what unites them. To a certain extent lies and mistakes present a 
degree of familiarity. Th e issue at stake might be stated in the following terms: what 
lies and mistakes have in common is the fact that both traffi  c in falseness. However, 
a substantial diff erence separates them. It is possible to single out at least two 
dimensions of falsity: an objective dimension of falsity and a subjective dimension. 
Errors att ain to the former, lies to the latt er. 
To put it in Gabriel Falkenberg’s (1985: 17, emphasis in the original) words: 
… ] What people say can diverge from what they think, or believe: linguistic 
appearance need not conform to the psychological reality behind it …. What 
people say can diverge from how things are: linguistic representation need not 
conform to the reality out there.
At this point one could ask what constitute falsehood for Augustine. In the examination 
of errors or mistakes Augustine adheres to a defi nition of falsehood as objective 
untruth, that is, a defi nition of falsehood as non-correspondence to facts, or things 
as they are. In the Enchiridion to Laurentius on faith, hope and charity, Augustine drew 
the same distinction between lies and mistakes as outlined in the De mendacio. In the 
former, he investigated the nature of errors. His defi nition of somebody who errs and 
the errors qua such are both present in the following passage:
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…] It does not follow that he straightway errs whosoever is ignorant of any 
thing; but whosoever thinks himself to know what he knows not; seeing that 
he approves what is false as true, which properly belongs to error. … To err is 
nothing else than to think that true which is false, and what false which is true. 
(Ench. XVII)
One who speaks according to what he thinks or believes to be true can be mistaken, 
but he does not lie. Th is is an important distinction underscored by Augustine and 
acknowledged by many commentators. Jacques Derrida (2002: 31) says in History 
of the Lie:
One can be mistaken, one can be in error without lying; one can communicate 
to another some false information without lying. If I believe what I say, even 
if it is false, even if I am wrong, and if I am not trying to mislead someone by 
communicating this error, then I am not lying.
It is therefore a question of good faith that counts here and a matt er of awareness 
of being mistaken. Th is point is apparent in Augustine’s thought: “Whoever gives 
expression to that which he holds either through belief or assumption does not lie 
even though the statement itself be false” (De mend. 3.3).26 Augustine reiterated the 
same point in other writings. In Sermon 113, for instance, he made a similar point 
arguing for the diff erence between being deceived and lying. He states:
He is deceived who thinks what he says to be true, and therefore says it, because 
he thinks it true. Now if this which he that is deceived says, were true, he would 
not be deceived; if it were not only true, but also knew it to be true, he would 
not lie. He is deceived then, in that is false, and he thinks it true; but he only 
says it because he thinks it true. Th e error lies in human infi rmity, not in the 
soundness of the conscience. But whosoever thinks it to be false, and asserts it 
as true, he lies. (Sermon LXXXIII, 4)
Notably, in the aforementioned passage Augustine speaks of errors in terms of being 
deceived or self-deceived. However, this is not to say that he considered cases of 
self-deception. He simply meant that one might be unwillingly tricked when he falls 
in error. Th e one who mistakes does not know he is telling a falsehood for it takes it 
as if it were true, hence he deceives himself in the sense of being mistaken. As Paul 
Ekman (1985: 26) pointed out:
26 Muldowney 1952: 55.
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Many people – for example, those who provide false information unwitt ingly – 
are untruthful without lying. A woman who has the paranoid delusion that she 
is Mary Magdalene is not a liar, although her claim is untrue. (Ekman 1985: 26)
Th e importance of the split between mistakes and lying lies in the fact that the 
latt er prescinds from whether the things expressed are true or false for it is from the 
intention to deceive that a liar must be judged. On the contrary, errors, as we have 
seen, in order to be thought of as mistakes need a comparison between paradigms 
or the gaining of further, more qualifi ed knowledge about the world. Mistakes entail 
a conception of truth based on ontological exactness. Lies instead are assessed 
considering the condition of truthfulness, that is to say, the coherence between 
thoughts and words expressed and the agent’s intentionality. Lies thus are assessed 
irrespectively of the falsity of what is stated or signifi ed. We have seen that the 
Bishop of Hippo returned to the distinction several times throughout his writings as 
for instance in the De doctrina christiana. Th e same point is fi rmly expressed in the 
De mendacio:
…] A person is to be judged as lying or not lying according to the intention of 
his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the matt er itself.27
Th e diff erence between lies and mistakes can be formalized as presented in Table 2. 
Hence in assessing a mistake we hold to the ontological conception of truth 
for we need to assess the correspondence of what has been expressed to the things 
of the real world. In lying this condition is missing, for lies are assessed according 
to a mismatch between what is thought and what is expressed, regardless of the 
ontological truth of the things stated. Proceeding from this distinction it is possible 
to tell the truth while lying and express falsehood without lying. 
Table 2.  Summary of Augustine’s distinction between mistakes, lies and asserting the truth 
as outlined in De mendacio.
WHAT I THINK WHAT I SAY FACTS
MISTAKE FALSE FALSE TRUE
LIE FALSE TRUE TRUE OR FALSE
TO SAY THE TRUTH TRUE TRUE TRUE
27 Muldowney 1952: 55.
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10. Pretending, acting and non-verbal deception
Drawing on Augustine’s insights about lying we have been observing the intention to 
say a falsehood and the intention to deceive. As we have seen, jokes lack the intention 
to deceive, but do present an intention to express falsehood. Errors, instead, do not 
meet any of the suggested criteria for they occur as if speaking truthfully, that is out 
of ignorance and with good faith. Th e Augustinian lie, on the contrary, meets both 
the criteria of being a believed – falsity asserted in order to mislead. What has been 
left  out is a consideration of the cases in which there exists an intention to deceive 
without the intention of asserting a falsehood. 
Lying entails the usage of signs and signs used in order to mislead do not 
necessarily have to be words. Th is article has been supporting a perspective on 
lying as intentional deception realized by means of signs, no matt er their nature. 
Along with Jerzy Pelc (1992: 248), we hold the view that lying does not necessary 
have to be a verbal behaviour, for “faces, gestures, activities, silence, refraining from 
action, the presence or absence at some point in space in time, all these may be lies 
in certain conditions”.
It is worth recalling, once again, the defi nition of lying outlined by Augustine in 
De mendacio:
He lies … who holds one opinion in his mind and who gives expression to 
another through words or any other outward manifestation. … Th e fault 
of the person who tells a lie consists in his desire to deceive in expressing his 
thought. (De mend. 3.3)
Th e point to be made here is that, according to the abovementioned defi nition, 
it is apparent that for Augustine one can lie either through words or by signs of 
whatever kind. Colish (1982: 33), who stressed the role that silence may play in 
lying, acknowledged the present claim:
One can lie or bear false witness by remaining silent, in a situation where silence 
conveys an understood message. Silence, like speech, is eloquent, and its power 
to communicate one’s intentions rests similarly on the prior relations between 
the questioner and the man who makes a silent response.
However, throughout his life Augustine devoted much more space to the study of 
words than of other signs. Th is preference was germane to his general design, that is 
to teach exegesis, and the signs used in the Bible are conventional verbal signs. Th e 
supremacy of the word among other signs is a tenet underscored by Augustine in 
De doctrina christiana. Here, Augustine outlined his general theory of signifi cation 
and singled out two classes of signs, signa naturalia (natural sign) and signa data 
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(given sign). In the second book of De doctrina christiana Augustine pointed out the 
preponderance of words among other signs used by men stating that:
…] Words have come to be predominant among men for signifying whatever 
the mind conceives if they wish to communicate it to anyone.  [… Neverthe-
less, a multitude of innumerable signs by means of which men express their 
thoughts is made up of words. And I could express the meaning of all signs of 
the type here touched upon in words, but I would not be able at all to make the 
meanings of words clear by these signs. (De doc. chr. II, 3)
Th is passage underscores two important Augustinian tenets. Th e fi rst concerns the 
importance of words for communication and semiosis among mankind. Th e second 
concerns the nature of that supremacy. As Gary Genosko (1995: 91) pointed out: 
“verbal signs are the means by which all other varieties of semiosis may be expressed, 
but not vice versa” (Genosko 1995: 91). To put it another way, for Augustine 
language is a primary modelling system, “a system into which any other semiotic 
system can be translated” (Manett i 1993: 196). 
Augustine’s stance concerning the overwhelming importance of words may have 
important consequences for the study of lying. It might be argued that, inasmuch as 
he envisaged words as the most suitable signs designated for human communication, 
lying may bee seen as a phenomenon that is entirely confi ned to writt en or spoken 
words. Griffi  ths (2004: 33) endorses a similar view:
Nonverbal actions cannot be lies. It is possible to make public one’s thought 
without words (by gesture or other nonverbal sign), and it is also possible to 
choose to misinterpret what one thinks in these ways. But such cases lie outside 
Augustine’s defi nition. He is, for the most part, concerned only with speech (or 
writing). He does say that one can lie with nonverbal signifi ers. But once having 
said so, he scarcely returns to such cases. (Griffi  ths 2004: 33)
I hold that this claim is untenable. On the contrary, it is possible to deceive by means 
of non-verbal signs as long as there is a sign system with a shared con vention and the 
intention to deceive. 
Undeniably, Augustine conceived of words as having a special place among signs. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Th omas Aquinas, this is not to say that one cannot 
lie non-verbally. Aquinas writes:
As Augustine says, among all signs words occupy the fi rst place. In the saying, 
then, that lying is a false meaning in words, by ‘words’ every sort of sign is 
meant. Hence were one intend to convey something false by nodding he would 
not be innocent of lying. (Summa theol, 2a2ae, 110, 1.3)
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Along with Augustine and Aquinas, we subscribe to the view that lying entails a 
sign function, regardless of the nature of signs that are involved. As we have seen, 
the criteria for discerning whether there is a lie concern the intention to signify and 
the intention to deceive, regardless of the nature of the sign as such. It is the usage 
of signs made by the interpreter, and the agent’s intention to play a crucial role in 
qualifying whether a lie occurs or not.
A broad defi nition of lying was outlined by Sissela Bok (1999[1978]: 13) who 
held that one may deceive “through gesture, through disguise, by means of action 
or inaction, even through silence” and that lying may occur “verbally or in writing, 
but can of course also be conveyed via smoke signals, Morse code, sign language, 
and the like” as long as these messages are stated. Even broader is the defi nition of 
lying drawn by David Livingstone Smith as “any form of behaviour the function 
of which is to provide others with false information or to deprive them of true 
information” therefore “breast implants, hairpieces, feigned illnesses, faked orgasms, 
and phony smiles are just a few examples of nonverbal lying” (Smith 2004: 14, italics 
in original). Notably, the Platonic Hippias minor, in an att empt to single out the 
diff erence between lying with intention of deceiving and lying unwillingly, referred 
to a case of fake limp that is an example of nonverbal deception.
Having said that, a point that certainly deserves att ention is the existing 
diff erence between ‘simulation’ and ‘lying’ and ‘fake’ and ‘fi ctitious’. Simulation is 
a “behavioural form of lying”28; it can be fake or fi ctitious and thus entail either 
deceptive or being non-deceitful character.
As to the distinction between ‘fake’ and ‘fi ctitious’ it can be said, along with 
Marina Mizzau (1997) and Umberto Eco (1997), that the diff erence between the 
two terms lies in the fact that the former does not display the signs of being fake, 
therefore pretending to be taken as authentic or true. On the contrary, the latt er – 
the fi ctitious – exhibits the signs of being untruthful. For instance, the theatrical 
masking is fi ctitious inasmuch as it does not pretend to be taken as serious, in other 
words the audience is aware of the fi ctional character of the theatrical masking. In 
this respect the fi ctitious has a similar logic to play and jokes that, as we have seen, 
exhibit the signs of their fi ctional character. 
On the other hand, faking involves an intention of being taken as genuine and to 
hide the signs that are evidence of fakery as, for instance, a woman’s wig, for it aims at 
being taken as real. From the aforesaid it is apparent that the fi ctitious is ruled by the 
logic of the ‘as if ’. As Umberto Eco pointed out, acting ‘as if ’ being someone else by 
wearing a mask on a theatrical stage is diff erent than putt ing on a mask of Diabolik and 
faking to be another person in order to rob a bank (Eco 1997: 33). To put it diff erently, 
the fi ctitious and the fake belong to the family of ‘pretending’, considered in a broad 
sense. In both cases, faking and fi ction, there is the pretence of being someone else 
28 “Simulare è una forma comportamentale di menzogna” (Eco 1997: 34). My translation – R. G.
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or something else. Th e diff erence lies in the fact that the latt er, the fi ctitious, does 
not involve any intention to deceive, whereas the former, the fake, does involve the 
intention to mislead. Another way of tackling this issue would be to draw a diff erence 
between ‘pretending’ and ‘acting’, the former conceived as “an intentional deceptive 
move obtained through counterfeiting that which the hearer is intended to assume” 
as for instance “by limping, one can counterfeit lameness” (Vincent, Castelfranchi 
1981: 754–755). On the other hand, ‘acting’ can be seen as “the non-deceptive sister 
of pretending” inasmuch as the one who acts and the addressee of such action are 
“accomplices in a game which involves the entertainment of two contradictory worlds: 
one, the real world, where x is false (a pretence), and the other, a fi ctional or imaginary 
world, where x is true” (Vincent, Castelfranchi 1981: 755).
Having distinguished acting from pretending on the base of the criterion of 
intentionality, it is clear that pretending, inasmuch as it involves a certain degree of 
intentional deception, share this feature with the Augustinian lie. However, what 
distinguishes them is the fi rst criterion that we have indicated as being germane 
to lying, namely the intention to assert a falsehood. To put it another way, what is 
missing in pretending as a form of deception is the character of assertion that we 
have seen to be important for the defi nition of the lie. 
Th e last point to be considered is whether one can lie by means of silence and 
concealment. Augustine raised the question of whether one may lie through silence 
in several passages of the De mendacio and the Contra mendacium. Th e issue at stake 
is the capability of non-verbal signs in the signifi cation of lying. Colish has raised 
the issue in an article entitled “St. Augustine’s rhetoric of silence revisited” (1978). 
She takes issue with an earlier article dealing with the issue of silence in Augustine 
published by Joseph A. Mazzeo (1962) who neglected the possibility that one 
can lie by remaining silent. Th e issue of silence in relation with lying occurs with 
respect to Augustine’s examination of the situation in which a man is asked about 
the whereabouts of another man who is hiding from a murderer. Augustine writes: 
If a murderer fl ee to a Christian, or if the Christian see where he has fl ed, and 
be questioned about this matt er by one who seeks the murderer to bring him 
to punishment, should the Christian lie? … Will you remain hesitant and 
uncertain between the charge of false testimony and of betrayal, or, by keeping 
silent or by asserting that you will not answer, will you avoid both charges? (De 
mend. 13.22)
Th e point Augustine made here is that one actually lies or bears false witness 
if remaining silent when one is asked a question to which one knows the answer 
equals a concealment of the truth and there is an intention to deceive. Th is is not 
to say, however, that every sort of silence involves concealment with the intention 
to mislead. A point to be made here is the diff erence between secrets and lies. Th e 
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former entails concealment, as well as the case when one lies by means of silence. 
Th e diff erence lies in the fact that silence, in other words, can be lying by omission. 
Secrets, on the contrary do not aim at deceiving. Hence we have to distinguish the 
intention not to say something (concealing) from the intention to omit something 
in order to deceive (lying by omission).
On the ground of the diff erences outlined in the present section, and taking 
into consideration the two Augustinian characteristics of the lie we can propose a 
fourfold inventory of falsehoods, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Fourfold typology of falsehood based on Augustine’s criteria of double intentionality.
Type of falsehood Intention to assert a falsehood Intention to deceive
Lie + +
Joke/Fiction + -
Error/ Mistake - -
Pretending/Omission - +
11. Conclusion
Th e present study has proposed a semiotic account of mendacity and its major drift  
has been to point out the relevance that topics of lying, deception, mendacity and 
truthfulness may have for semiotics. Drawing on Augustine of Hippo’s insights about 
lying, the current study has sought to look at the phenomenon of human deception 
in order to show its semiotic import. 
Th e two books Augustine dedicated to the lie, in particular De mendacio, present 
a special laboratory for the semiotician to the extent that they provide specifi c 
theoretical insights about the nature of lying as such. In scrutinizing the nature of 
lying Augustine cannot avoid touching on some important points that are of critical 
importance for the semiotician. One may argue why and to what extent Augustine’s 
theory of lying is to be considered as semiotic. All in all, Augustine was a man of 
faith, a theologian, and it can be argued that his main concerns were religious, 
apologetic, and pastoral. To be sure, Augustine never mentioned the word ‘semiotic’ 
in the two opuscola that treated the issue of lying, since he was concerned with other 
kinds of issues, as we have already indicated in the introduction. Nonetheless, the 
way in which he sets forth the defi nition of the lie and the signifi cant role given to 
the liar’s intentionality fall under the rubric of what today is called ‘semiotics’. I refer 
to at least three reasons that ground such claim:
1) lying makes use of signs. From this inescapable principle we can underpin what 
I called, following Umberto Eco (1975) and Jerzy Pelc (1992), the semiotic 
foundation of lying;
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2) lying has nothing to do with objective reality, or bett er with truth as correspon-
dence of a statement with objective reality. As we have seen, for Augustine it 
is possible to lie while telling the (objective) truth. Rather than truth, lying 
engages with truthfulness, conceived as perceived, believed or assumed truth by 
an interpreter;
3)  the intention to deceive is a fundamental and necessary feature of the act of lying. 
Th is tenet bears important consequences for the pragmatic aspect of the lie and 
it also brings to the table the role of the agency in performing an act of lying. 
Th e paper’s focus on the Augustinian theoretical treatment of the lie is to be considered 
as a choice that allowed tackling three kinds of issues. Th e fi rst one concerns the lack 
of att ention and ink spilled by semioticians on the issue of lying. We believe that 
the signifi cance of lying and deception to others has been downplayed in the past 
research and underestimated by semioticians. Hence, the present work’s ambition is 
to be considered as a humble att empt to overcome the aforementioned theoretical 
lacuna. Furthermore, this study aimed at re moving the topic from being a special 
concern of moral philosophers and psycho logists, placing it under the scrutiny of a 
semiotic perspective. What the present study has sought to achieve is the relevance for 
semiotics of the topic of lying and a suggestion to consider it not only as a corollary 
of the bold claim that semiotics has to do with everything that can be taken as a lie 
(Eco 1976), a defi nition that has become almost an empty formula to be quoted in 
handbooks of semiotics. Th e paper’s chief contribution is to be found, instead, in its 
insistence on the importance that the usage of signs has for its interpreters. Th is is to 
say that, the study of a topic such as lying viewed from an Augustinian perspective 
has brought into consideration the pragmatic dimension of semiosis conceived as the 
relation ship between sign and sign users, a point that was acknowledged by Charles 
Morris (1971) forty years ago, has been almost neglected in contemporary semiotic 
scholarship. Th e third point to be considered is the choice of sources. Th at is to say, 
focusing mainly on the analysis of the works of one author, namely Augustine of 
Hippo, may be seen as a narrow approach on a topic that certainly deserves a more 
extensive perspective. Nonetheless, the focus on the Augustinian view on lying has 
provided an opportunity to delimit the object of study in an appropriate way, and to 
establish a discussion starting from a milestone publication, although almost neglected 
in contemporary semiotic scholarship, in the treatment of human deception. Indeed, 
Augustine was one of the fi rst thinkers who provided a systematic study of lying and 
lies – the bishop of Hippo has been remembered in the history of Christianity and in 
the history of Western thought for other achievements. Nonetheless, the present work 
has att empted to give a small contribution in the revival of the De mendacio, which has 
received scant consideration among scholars. 
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Августин о лжи: 
теоретическое обрамление для изучения типов неправды
В статье дается теоретический обзор проблемы лжи в семиотической перспективе. 
Конкретной целью является анализ теории лжи Святого Августина (354–430). Он посвятил 
этой теме две короткие заметки: “De mendacio” (О лжи) и “Contra mendacium” (Против 
лжи). В статье выделяются в качестве фундаментальных и необходимых признаков лжи 
удвоение и желание обмануть. Главным вкладом Августина в изучение лжи было разделение 
оценочной и фактической неправды. Развивая эту мысль, автор статьи различает два типа 
интенциональности – намерение подтвердить ложь и намерение ввести в заблуждение. 
На основе этого разделения предлагается типология лжи, в которой различаются шутка, 
ошибка, ложь и притворство.
Augustinus valetamisest: 
Teoreetiline raam ebatõesuse tüüpide uurimiseks
Käesolevas artiklis vaadeldakse valetamise probleemi teoreetiliselt semiootilisest perspektiivist 
ja käsitluse konkreetseks eesmärgiks on analüüsida valeteooriat, nagu selle esitas Hippo piiskop 
Aurelius Augustinus (354–430), tuntud ka Püha Augustinusena. Ta pühendas valetamisele 
kaks lühikest kirjutist: “De mendacio” (Valetamisest) ja “Contra mendacium” (Valetamise vastu), 
kirjutatud vastavalt ca 395. ja 420. aastal. Käesolev artikkel keskendub silmakirjalikkusele ning 
petmistahtlusele kui valetamise fundamentaalsetele ja vajalikele omadustele. Augustinuse 
peamine panus inimliku petlikkuse uurimisse oli see, et ta lahutas hinnangu selle kohta, mis 
on vale, faktilisest ebatõesusest. Augustinuse jaoks on valetamismõiste tuumaks tahtluse idee. 
Järgides seda mõtt elõnga, eristatakse artiklis kaht tüüpi tahtlust, nimelt tahtlust väita midagi 
ebatõest ning kavatsust kedagi eksitada. Tahtluse sellise kahetise olemuse põhjal püütakse 
käesolevas artiklis visandada teoreetilist raami ebatõesuse tüüpide uurimiseks. Tulemuseks on 
ebatõesuse tüpoloogia, milles visandakse neljatine jaotus, mis põhineb naljade, eksituste, valede 
ning teeskluse vahelisel erinevustel. 
